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Abstract
This paper  evaluates the recent movement of Japanese fiscal reform.  We first
summarize fiscal policy in 1990s. Then, we investigate several relevant topics of fiscal policy
such as the macroeconomic impact of government debt and the sustainability problem.  We
then consider dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic
game among various interest groups. This paper points out that the long-run structural reform
is more important than the short-run Keynesian policy in Japan.
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1. Japanese government's deficits
Japan’s fiscal situation in 2000 is the worst of any G7 country, having deteriorated
rapidly with the collapse of the ‘bubble economy’ in 1991 and the deep and prolonged period
of economic recession which ensued, and from which recovery has been slow and modest
despite the implementation of counter-cyclical policy.   In this section let us first summarize
briefly the movement of fiscal deficits and fiscal reform in Japan.
Traditionally, the Japanese government has followed a balanced budget policy.  The
balanced budget was maintained until 1965, when national bonds were first issued in the
postwar period.  The gap between government expenditures and tax revenues, which
corresponds roughly to fiscal deficits, began to expand rapidly at the outbreak of the first oil
shock in 1973.  Asako et. al. (1991) and Ishi and Ihori (1992) presented good description of
the rise and fall of deficits in 1970s and 1980s in Japan.   They interpreted that the increase of
deficits in the second half of 1970s as a combination of several factors.  The larger fiscal
deficits resulted from the major burst of new spending on social welfare programs in the first
half of 1970s and on public investment in the second half of 1970s and the lack of tax
revenues reflecting the slowdown of economic growth.
Since the increase in the budget deficit in 1975, deficit reduction has become one of
the most important objectives of economic policy.  Eliminating fiscal deficits was officially
called 'fiscal reconstruction'.  MOF (The Ministry of Finance) constantly pressured each
ministry of the government to hold down expenditures when drawing up the initial budget.
Since 1982 the principle of zero growth requests (zero ceiling) has been imposed on budget
requests.  The ceiling was sharply tightened to negative increases in the late 1980s.3
Furthermore, the important step was the establishment of the Ad Hoc Council on
Administrative Reform (Rincho) in 1981.  Rincho submitted five reports from July 1981 to
March 1983 and recommended a number of important reforms to trim overly expanded
portions of the government bureaucracy: privatization of three major public corporations, cuts
in spending on public works and so on.  As the result of such policies, the growth of
government expenditure has indeed been restrained.
Along with severe spending constraints imposed by Rincho to promote the goal of
reducing deficits, MOF began to fall back on various small measures to increase tax revenues.
MOF did not however pursue major tax reforms which would have greatly altered the basic
tax structure until late 1980s.  The value added tax (VAT) was finally introduced in the tax
structure in April 1989, after long-standing trial and error.
The substantial amount of natural tax increases has been produced from 1986 to
1991.  The abnormal hike of stock and land prices generated a great amount of tax revenues
in the form of the corporate tax, the security transaction tax, capital gains tax, etc.  Such a
large amount of natural tax increases was of great help in reducing accumulated deficits,
which in turn achieved the target of fiscal reconstruction by 1991.  The sharp rise of tax
revenues, caused by a bubble phenomenon, looks like "windfall".  "Windfall" tax increases
have played a vital role in achieving the MOF's target in the second half of 1980s.
After a "bubble economy" was broken in 1991, natural tax decreases were incurred
to generate revenue.  At the same time the politico-economic pressures for larger expenditure
budgets and counter-cyclical packages of fiscal measures intensified.  Responding to them,
MOF (The Ministry of Finance)  employed some measures for stimulating the aggregate
demand.  However, these counter-cyclical measures were not so effective, resulting in an
increase in the fiscal deficit.  The planned bond-dependency rate rose from a low-point of4
7.6% in FY 1991 (initial) to 18.7% in FY 1994 (initial).  The reality was still worse.  The
implementation of counter-cyclical fiscal policy through Supplementary-Budgets in-year led
to further borrowing still, and the actual bond-dependency rate was more than 22% in FY
1994.
The state of the national finances deteriorated rapidly throughout FY 1995 and FY
1996.  MOF was forced to borrow 22.0 trillion to finance a deficit swollen by the large fiscal
stimulus in September 1995, resulting in a bond-dependency ratio of 28.2%, its highest level
since 1980.  In FY 1996 the planned issue of 10.1 trillion of special deficit bonds exceeded
all previous experience.  Despite the gravity of the fiscal situation the initial  budgets for FY
1996 and 1997 nevertheless provided for further increases of expenditure, of 5.8% and 3.0%.
Not only were fixed costs for prior commitments rising: those for discretionary expenditures
continued to rise as well. The servicing of that debt absorbed more than a fifth of the total
General Account Budget.    Limiting the latter to 1.5% ceiling  in FY 1997 was claimed by the
Government and MOF as a sign of new fiscal austerity.
FY 1998  initial  budget was drawn up making utmost efforts to deal with the current
economic and financial situation within the framework of the Fiscal Structural Reform Act.
According to MOF, fiscal reconstruction  was equivalent to t he achievement of the three
policy-objectives of
(I) the elimination of special balanced bonds
(ii) the reduction of the bond-dependency ratio to reduce fiscal deficits on the path to a
balanced budget
(iii) the reduction of the size and service-costs of the accumulated debt
The initial budget for FY 1998 marked the beginning of a new realism in the control of public
spending promised in PM Hashimoto’s  ‘Vision’ of fiscal structural reform.  The Fiscal5
Structural Reform Act, which was implemented in November 1997, had three targets to be
achieved by FY 2003.
(i)   the elimination of special balanced bonds
(ii)  the reduction of general government debt-GDP ratio to 60%
(iii)   the reduction of general government deficit-GDP ratio to 3%
General expenditures  were down 1.3% over FY 1997 initial budget, the largest
decline in history.  However, in the light of severe economic and financial situation, The
Fiscal Structural Reform Act was revised in May 1998, so that income tax reduction would be
easily implemented.  Furthermore, since the LDP lost the upper house election in July 1998,
new PM Obuchi changed the target of fiscal policy.  Namely,  further tax reductions and
increases in public works  have been implemented to stimulate the aggregate demand,
following the traditional Keynesian counter-cyclical policy. The Fiscal Structural Reform Act
is not regarded as a legal constraint any more.  In FY 1998 the issue of special deficit bonds
was 21.7 trillion yen due to several fiscal policy measures.  By the end of FY 1999 the
accumulated debt was total 327 trillion, equal to 65% of GDP.  The deficit on the general
government financial balance in FY 1999 was 10.0% of GDP, with a gross debt of over 108%.
The inclusion of the surplus on social security reduced that deficit to  7.8%, and even  that
figure was highest among G7.
In order to evaluate the recent movement of fiscal deficits and fiscal reform in Japan,
the present paper investigates the following three points: debt neutrality, sustainability and
fiscal reconstruction.  Our main concern here is to evaluate the fiscal reconstruction process.
The Japanese government among many governments has been attempting to return to the
balanced budget by raising taxes and/or reducing public spending.   However, since most of
transfer payments and public works are actually controlled by interest groups, such attempts6
would not always be successful.  After introducing the consumption tax Japan’s government
deficit has grown rapidly mainly due to increases in transfer payments and public works.  It
is important to investigate how raising taxes would affect fiscal reconstruction.  T he critical
point of formulating fiscal reconstruction process is to clarify how the existing privileges of
interest groups such as preferential treatments of public works, taxes, and/or subsidies are to
be abandoned.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) presented a simple model of delayed stabilization due to
a war of attrition among various interest groups and derived the expected time of stabilization
as a function of characteristics of those groups.  I nstead of the war-of-attrition model, Ihori
and Itaya (1998) have developed a dynamic game among various interest groups which would
accept voluntarily increases in their net tax burden (or abandon some of group-specific
privileges) in order to gain the benefits resulting from a reduction in government debts.
Recently, Becker and Mulligan (1998) showed that “more efficient” tax system such as raising
consumption taxes brings larger governments.  Velasco (1997) investigated the endogenous
path of government debt in the non-cooperative and cooperative dynamic game models and
showed that the cooperative equilibrium tends to be violated when the level of debt is low.
Based on Velasco (1997), we develop an analytical framework which explores the impact of
raising taxes on fiscal reconstruction, and then empirically examine the impact.
The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 investigates the plausibility
of debt neutrality in the Japanese economy.  There are two types of debt neutrality, Ricardian
neutrality and Barro (1974)’s neutrality.  The weak version of Ricardian neutrality seems
more plausible than the strong version of Barro's neutrality.  Section 3 investigates whether
Japan’s fiscal policy has been sustainable in the sense of being consistent with an
intertemporal budget constraint.  Section 4 investigates the property of Japanese fiscal7
reconstruction based on a game-theoretic approach of interest groups.  Finally, section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Debt neutrality
There have been many papers of investigating empirical evidence on the impact of
government budget variables on private consumption and on the debt neutrality hypothesis.
Homma et. al. (1984) and Ihori (1989) are empirical studies on debt neutrality in Japan.
Following Ihori (1989), we estimate the private sector consumption function and investigate
the degree of debt neutrality for the period 1970蝔-1998蝕.
We develop a finite-horizon model of identical individuals.  Each agent throughout
his life faces a constant probability of death,  p.  Under the assumption that  instantaneous
utility is logarithmic, aggregate consumption is given by
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where C is aggregate consumption,  q is the rate of time preference, YW is labor income, G is
government expenditure, r is the rate of interest, B is government debt, K is real capital, and F
is foreign assets.
The above consumption function has the following policy implication.  An increase
in taxes and debt ( dT = rdB >0) does not affect permanent income but leads agents feel
wealthier by an amount p/(p + r)dB.  This leads then to increase consumption and dissave
and to decumulate foreign assets. p/(p + r) may be regarded as the wealth effect of debt.  If
p/(p + r) is zero, debt will not be regarded as net wealth.  We have the extreme debt neutrality
case.  If p/(p + r) is unity, debt will be regarded as being almost perfect substitutable with
foreign assets.  We have the extreme Keynesian case.  Therefore it is natural to denote by 1-8
p/(p + r) the degree of debt neutrality.
We set the consumption function for the estimation as the following:
t t t t t t u F a B a G Y a a C + + + - + = 3 2 1 0 ) ( (2)
where Y is NNP.  The index of debt neutrality x is given by x=1 2 3 -a a / .
Table 1 reports the estimates of the OLS in the first differences.  The coefficient on
B is positive but smaller than the coefficient on F.  The degree of debt neutrality is calculated
as 66% for the whole sample period.  The debt neutrality is more valid in recent years (86%)
but not perfectly valid.
We may derive the following implications for fiscal policy in Japan.  First, the
strong version of debt neutrality (Barro’s neutrality) is not perfectly valid.  Hence, the
government debt has  some  real effects and debt burden could be transferred to future
generations.  Second, people are concerned with long-run effects of fiscal policy.  The
private sector would have enough information to know the structure of the government budget
constraint. It is plausible to conjecture that behavior in the real world may fall between these
extremes: the strong version of Barro’s debt neutrality and the simple Keynesian hypothesis.
In other words, the weak version of Ricardian neutrality is well valid.
3. Sustainability problem
In 1990s we have experienced a rapid increase in fiscal deficits.  In 2000s it would
be expected that an increase in transfer payments (a decrease in net tax revenues) due to aging
will contribute to higher primary deficits. It is very important to restrain the increasing trend in
transfer payments.
There have been a few analyses on the sustainability problem in the government debt9
in Japan.  So long as we use the data until 1990, it seems that the government debt has been
sustainable in Japan.  However, as explained in section 1,  fiscal  deficits have increased
rapidly since 1990.  We are not sure if the present fiscal system in Japan may be sustainable
in the long run.  Bohn (1998) proposed a new method different from existing tests for
sustainability of government debt, which is based on estimating a transversality condition and
on cointegration methods.  His test has better properties than the conventional tests.  We
apply Bohn (1998)’s method to the test on sustainability of Japanese government debt.
His test is the following. Fiscal policy satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint,
i.e. the condition on  sustainability of government debt, if the primary surplus to GDP (st)
increases with the ratio of (start-of-period) debt to GDP (bt).  Suppose we express a relation
between the two as
st = f(bt) + mt (3)
where other determinants, mt, is bounded and the present value of future GDP is finite. Then,
government debt satisfies a transversality condition if there is a debt-GDP ratio  b ˆ  such that
f'(bt) ‡b >0 for all bt ‡b ˆ  (where b is a positive constant).  Bohn found that an increase in the
ratio of government debt to GDP raised the ratio of primary surplus to GDP for 1916-1995 in
the U.S.  It follows that U.S. fiscal policy satisfied an intertemporal budget constraint.
We focus on the (national) General Account in Japan.  We set the sample period as
FY 1956-1998 and FY 1965-1998; FY 1965 is the year that Japanese government begun to
issue debt in the General Account after the WWII.
Let us set f(bt) = bbt as a special case of equation (3), that is,
st = bbt + a0 + aGGVARt + aYYVARt + et, (4)
where GVARt is a measure of temporary government expenditure,  YVARt is a measure of
cyclical variations in GDP.  GVARt ” (Gt – G* t)/Yt, and YVARt ” (Ut – U
m)(G*t/Yt), where Gt,10
G*t,  Ut, and U
m denote real government expenditure, the permanent  component of Gt, the
unemployment rate and the median of Ut for the sample period, respectively.  We make data
on  G*t in Japan using  Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition of real government
expenditure into temporary and permanent components.  For FY 1955-1998, U
m is equal to
0.021.
We also assume f(bt) = bbt + g(bt–b )
2 instead of (3).  Then, in place of (4) we have
st = bbt + g(bt–b )
2 + a0 + aGGVARt + aYYVARt + et, (5)
where  b  denotes the average of bt for the sample period.  We estimate both equations (4)
and (5).
In estimating these equations, there exists serial  correlation in the error terms of
these equations.  Hence we use the maximum likelihood estimation.  Estimates of equation
(4) are reported in regressions (I), (II), (V), and (VI) in Table 2.  Also estimates of equation
(5) are reported in regressions (III), (IV), (VII), and (VIII) in Table 2.  Regressions (I)-(IV)
show results for the sample period FY 1956-1998, and regressions (V)-(VIII) show results for
the period FY 1965-1998.  r   in Table 2 denotes the estimator of first order autocorrelation
of the error term.
For the sample period FY 1956-1998, estimators of b, coefficient of b, in the linear
equation (4) are not significant.  Also estimators of the first-order and second-order terms in
the quadratic equation (5) are insignificant.  We cannot find a positive response of the
primary surplus-GDP ratio to changes in the debt-GDP ratio in the Japanese (national) General
Account for FY 1956-1998.
For FY 1965-1998, the estimator b is significantly positive in regression (V).  As
the estimator of GVAR is not significant in this regression, we exclude GVAR and reestimate
the equation (4). Its result is reported in regression (VI).  The estimator of b is insignificant11
in regression (VI).  Similarly, estimators of the first-order and second-order terms are
insignificant in regression (VIII).  These results do not support that Japanese government
debt satisfies a transversality condition for FY 1965-1998.
From the above analysis, we cannot reject that the Japanese national debt has not
been sustainable at least for recent years.  An intuitive explanation is as follows.  We draw a
scatter plot of the primary surplus-GDP ratio against the debt-GDP ratio in Figure 1.  Until
early 1990s, Japanese fiscal policy held the quadratic relation between the two.  Recently,
Japanese fiscal policy deviates from the relation excessively.  This is one of the reasons we
obtain the above result in this section.  Hence, it is important to reduce the government
deficit in the near future.
4. Fiscal reconstruction and raising taxes
4.1 Model
Velasco (1997) investigated the endogenous path of government debt in the non-
cooperative and cooperative dynamic game models and showed that the cooperative
equilibrium tends to be violated when the level of debt is low.  Based on Velasco (1997), we
develop an analytical framework which explores the impact of raising taxes on fiscal
reconstruction. Suppose that the economy is divided into  n regions and indexed by
n i , , 2 , 1 L = .  Regional governments are regarded as interest groups, seeking for public
works from the central government.  For simplicity, we assume that each region is endowed
with a unit of population.
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where we specify the instantanenous utility function as a logarithmic form.  In the objective
function (6),  *
i
t C  denotes the level of “effective” consumption  in region i in period t.  The
effective consumption  *
i
t C  is taken to be a function of private consumption expenditure 
i
t C ,
and the benefit of the public capital 
i
t G 1 -  which is accumulated in the preceding period:
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It is assumed that public capital does not have any interregional spillover effect.  In the
budget constraint (7), 
i
t A , y and T are assets, labor income and lump-sum taxes per capita in
region i respectively.  The labor income y and the lump-sum tax T are equal among regions
and constant over time.
For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate r is equal to the discount rate  r.  In
the case, it is optimal to keep the level of effective consumption  *
i
t C  constant over time.
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The central government levies tax, issues debt and allocates public investment
among regions.  The central government’s budget constraint is written as13








1 ) 1 (  ,  0
1













where  t B  is the (start-of-period) government debt.  Regional governments recognize the
central government’s budget constraint (10).  Therefore, the level of the effective
consumption  *
i
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The level of the effective consumption  *
i
t C  and the economic welfare depend on the initial
net asset  n B A t
i
t / - , the labor income y and the sequence of the public investment 
¥
=0 } { t
i
t G
腩 n i , , 2 , 1 L = 腪.  Thus, the crucial point is how the sequence of public investment 
¥
=0 } { t
i
t G
腩 n i , , 2 , 1 L = 腪 is determined
1.
The optimal size of public investment  * G  that maximizes the joint welfare of all
regions is given by
1+ = r m'( *) G . (12)
In the following policy-making process the optimal size of public investment  * G  is not
necessarily attained.  Each region determines the sequence 
¥
=0 } { t
i
t G  that maximizes (9) for
given T, claims it to the central government and brings it to his region.  From now on, we
assume three constraints on the region’s optimization problem.  First, no region can claim the
public investment that exceeds the optimal level  * G .  Second, each region must preserve
                                                
1 The change in the lump-sum tax never affects the level of consumption as long as the
sequence of the public investment 
¥
=0 } { t
i
t G  is not changed.  However, if a change in the
lump-sum tax affects the sequence of the public investment, it could affect the level of the
effective consumption and the economic welfare.14
the intertemporal budget constraint of the central government腃namely the  transversality
condition.  Third, the lump-sum tax T is pre-determined by the central  government, and
hence is taken as given by regions.  Under these assumptions we can describe the
optimization problem that the regions face as
2:
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We analyze the equilibrium dynamic process in the following two cases.  First, all
regions act in a coordinated fashion to maximize the joint welfare. In this case all interest
groups agree with fiscal reconstruction. Furthermore, if the central government could set the
constant lump-sum tax T in the proper level, the first best level of public investment would be
attained.  Second, all region behave non-cooperatively.  In this case fiscal reconstruction is
not effectively conducted by the central government.
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From (10) and (14), we can see that the level of the government debt remains constant over
time
3. Since the rate of time preference is equal to the rate of interest and the marginal benefit
                                                
2 The sequence is equal to the one that maximize (11) subject to (10) since (11) is obtained
by substituting (10) into (9).
3 The  transversality condition in (13) will be violated (negatively) if the lump-sum tax
exceeds n rB G t / *+ .  We assume that the central government never levies such a heavy
tax.15
of public capital decreases with G, it is desirable to keep public investment as well as private
consumption constant over time at the cooperative solution.
We now consider how an unexpected permanent increase in the lump-sum tax levied
by the central government affects public investment per region and private consumption.
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That is, the increase in public investment is just equal to the increase in the central
government’s permanent tax revenue. It does not affect the dynamics of public debt.
Next, let us turn to the case of non-cooperative dynamic game among regions. Since
maximization problem is identical for all regions, optimal policy for each region should be
identical too.  The optimal policy is the function of state variable  t B , but it is bounded by
* G :
[ ] * ), ( G B h MIN G t t = . (17)
Each region expects that all other regions make decisions according to the policy function (17).
Hence, it faces the following budget constraint obtained by substituting (17) into (10):
nT B h n B r B G t t t t + - - + - = + ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1   if   * ) ( G B h t £ ,
nT G n B r B G t t t + - - + - = + * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1     if   * ) ( G B h t ‡ . (18)
We now consider the behavior of public investment and government debt.  As
shown in Appendix, if the following condition is not satisfied, the level of the public











Then, from (18) the debt evolves as the following:16
) * ( ) 1 ( 1 T G n B r B t t - + + = + . (20)







￿ + + - + + + = + r
n r nT B n r B t t
) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1
f f , (21)
[ ] 1 ) 1 ( 1 0







The public investment falls as the government debt rises, and in the limit they converge to zero
and a finite level respectively.  Intuition is as follows.  When public debt is high, each
regional government believes that other regional governments would reduce public investment
(h’<0), reducing the effective rate of interest of financing public debt, (1+r)+(n-1)h’.  This
stimulates the free-riding behavior.  Namely, since the effective rate of interest declines with
public debt, each regional government desires a high level of public investment at the early
stage of the game.  Each region perceives that other regions will pay some parts of the
government debt redemption by reducing their public investment in the future.  The steady
state government bond is given by
r
nT
B = . (23)
Figure 2 shows the dynamic behavior of the government debt.  Line BB and B’B’ correspond
to (20) and (21) respectively.  Since public investment fluctuates due to the free-riding
behavior, welfare in the non-cooperative game is less than in the cooperative game.
We now consider how an unexpected permanent increase in lump-sum tax affects the
dynamic behavior of public investment per region and government debt. The public
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Note that (24) is positive since  f is negative.  Therefore, both public investment and steady
state government debt rise as the lump-sum tax rises.  The dynamics is shown in Figure 3.
It is also seen that an increase in taxes may reduce net issuance of public debt in the non-
cooperative game, while it does not affect net issuance of public debt in the cooperative game.
When the regions act in a coordinated fashion, the permanent increase in the lump-
sum tax stimulates pubic investment from now on by the same size, and it does not change the
level of central government debt.  On the contrary, under the situation of the non-cooperative
game, the permanent increase in the lump-sum tax stimulates public investment only in the
short run, and it causes an expansion of the government debt. To apply this model to the fiscal
reconstruction process, some applicable implications are obtained.  Namely, the impact of a
tax increase on public debt can tell whether fiscal reconstruction may be regarded as a
cooperative one or not.
According to (15) and (16), in the case where all interest groups act in a coordinated
fashion, an increase in the tax revenues leads to an increase in public investment or privileges
by the same amount, and not to a change in the public debt.  On the other hand, according to
(24) and (25) (see Figure 3), in the case where each interest group acts non-cooperatively, an
increase in the revenues leads to an increase in the public debt as well as an increase in public
investment.  By investigating whether (16) or (25) is held in the real economy, we may
explore the dynamic nature of fiscal reconstruction process.
Before doing some empirical studies, it would be useful to investigate how the
central government could induce regions to agree with a switch from the non-cooperative18
game equilibrium to the cooperative one.  Analytically this problem may be considered as
whether the cooperative equilibrium is stable or not.  We examine it by introducing trigger
strategies.
Suppose in period 0 the cooperative equilibrium is attained.  If the cooperative
equilibrium has been maintained in all t-1 preceding periods, regions cooperate in the period t
too; otherwise, they switch to the non-cooperative game equilibrium.
A region that defects from the cooperation solves
= ) ( 0 B W
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where  0 G  is given by (14), and  ) ( t B W  is the maximized objective function (13) in the case
of non-cooperative dynamic game.  We define  ) ( * 0 B W  as the maximized objective
function (14) in the cooperative situation.  If  ) ( 0 B W
d  exceeds  ) ( * 0 B W , the cooperative
equilibrium is unstable at the government debt level  0 B .
Figure 4 shows the possibility of this defection.  Under the non-cooperative game,
the later the consensus of fiscal reconstruction is attained, the more difficult to confirm it.
This is a different result from Velasco (1997).  Intuition is as follows.  A switch from the
cooperative game to the non-cooperative game produces a gain in the early stage and a loss in
the late stage.  When public debt is high, the stationary level of public spending becomes low
and hence the gain in the early stage would outweigh the loss in the late stage of the game.
4.2 Estimation
We analyze the General Account (excluding grants of local allocation tax) in FY19
1955-1997. In the General Account, expenditures by purpose are divided into the following
categories; national agencies, local government finance, national  defense, disposition of
external affairs, national land conservation and development (public works), industrial
development, education and culture, social security, pensions, government bonds, and other.
Based on the above model, we can  divide these variables as follows. The first group is
expenditures for provision of pure public goods, including national agencies, national defense,
disposition of external affairs, and education and culture, denoted by Z .  The second is
interest payment, equal to government bonds minus bond redemption, denoted by rB. The last
one is public investment and  privileges to regions,  including the remaining expenditures








On the revenue side, we divide the total revenue into tax and other revenues (T) and
net issue of debt (equal to public debt minus bond redemption:DB”Bt–Bt-1), excluding revenues
for grants of local allocation tax. We use these variables deflated by the GDP deflator.
We can apply literature on the revenue-expenditure nexus to our investigation. There
exist many previous studies on the relationship between revenues and expenditures in the
U.S.; e.g. von Fustenberg, Green and Jeong (1985, 1986), Manage and Marlow (1986), Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1989), and Owoye (1995).
In previous works, the Granger causality tests using the conventional VAR analysis
and ECMs have been used. One of these shortcomings is the tests cannot be implemented
when the orders of integration of revenues and expenditures are different, or when either order
of integration is more than two. To avoid it, we employ the method of Toda and Yamamoto
(1995)
4.  An advantage of this method is that we can implement the Granger causality tests
                                                
4 An example that employs this method on the revenue-expenditure nexus is Doi (1998).20
when the order of integration of revenues is not equal to that of expenditures and when either
order of integration is more than two. The method is as follows.
We consider the following VAR of an N-vector time series 
¥
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Fi (i = 1,2,  …, k, …, l) denotes an N·N matrix of coefficients, t denotes a vector of a time
trend, and e t denotes an N-vector of the innovation. We assume that the order of integration of
Xt is at most dmax around a linear trend. dmax denotes the maximal order of integration of
variables in Xt.
First, we select the lag length in (27). According to Toda and  Yamamoto (1995),
under the following null hypothesis:
H'0: Fm+1 = …= Fl = 0, where k £ m £ l-1
the usual  Wald statistic obtained from the OLS estimators of coefficients in (27), has an
asymptotic c
2 distribution with  N
2(l–m) degrees of freedom if m ‡ dmax. After this test, we
select the lag length as the null hypothesis can be rejected. l denotes the selected lag length.
For implementing the Granger causality tests, we estimate the following VAR:
t t t t t å X X X t b b X + F + + F + + F + + = - - - l l k k L L 1 1 1 0 , (28)
In this regression, the i-th variable, Xit, does not Granger-cause the j-th variable, Xjt, if we
cannot reject the following null hypothesis:
H0: j
1
ji = …= j
l
ji = 0.
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) proved that under the above null hypothesis, the usual  Wald21
statistic obtained from the OLS estimators of coefficients in (28), has an asymptotic  c
2
distribution with l degrees of freedom if l ‡ k + dmax. Note that the conditions, l ‡ k + dmax
and k ‡ 1, must be satisfied.

















) ,  where Y denotes GDP.
Before the Granger causality tests, we implement the unit root tests. We employ the
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests because the number of observation of these variables is not
enough large in order to implement the Phillips-Perron tests. We use the criteria advocated by
Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias and Fuller (1994), and based on the principle of parsimony in
deciding the lag length.
We found the order of integration of each variable by the augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests. We set the 5% significance level in testing the null hypothesis that the variable has a unit
root. The order of integration of each variable is identified by the tests. From these results, we


















In the next step, we select the lag length of VAR. As mentioned above, we decide the
lag length, l, using the Wald statistic. We note that the conditions, l ‡ k + dmax and k ‡ 1, must
be satisfied. As a result, we set l =3.
We estimate the VAR equations (28), which lag length is equal to 3.  The results are
reported in Table 3.  We then implement the Granger causality tests based on the  Wald
statistics from the OLS estimators. The Wald statistics are reported in Table 4.  Figure 522
summarizes the results of the Granger causality tests.
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) is strong. It suggests that an increase in the tax
revenues leads to an increase in privileges as well as a decrease in the net issuance of public
debt in the Japanese fiscal reconstruction, which is consistent with the analytical result of non-
cooperative game in section 4.3. Also, an increase in taxes leads to an increase in the level of
public debt outstanding, which is consistent with the result of non-cooperative game too.  In
other words, the Japanese government was not strong enough to persuade interest groups to
cooperate with fiscal reconstruction in the above sample period. We could not exclude free-
riding behavior of interesting groups.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that Barro’s neutrality does not hold perfectly in Japan and there
exists serious concern with the sustainability of fiscal policy in 1990s.  Hence, it would be
important to reduce government deficits in the long run. The long run structural fiscal reform
is more important than the short run Keynesian policy in Japan. We have also shown that the
free riding problem in the fiscal  reconstruction process is aggravated when players’ choices
are conditional on the observable collective variables.  Therefore, it would be much difficult
to induce all interest groups to cooperate when the government debt becomes large and the
fiscal crisis becomes serious.  In words, the sooner the fiscal reconstruction movement begins,
the more likely we would have successful fiscal reconstruction outcome.
The most important policy’s lesson from these analyses is that if the program of23
fiscal reconstruction is too flexible in the sense that it allows each interest group to reconsider
the predetermined policies such as tax increases or subsidy cuts at each point in time when the
outcome of fiscal reconstruction is revealed, it is highly likely that fiscal reconstruction ends
finally in much failure.  Allowing such possibility would straighten an incentive of each
group to free ride.  In order to realize successful fiscal reconstruction, therefore, we have to
stick to the long-term program for fiscal reconstruction that has been agreed at the beginning
of planning period.  In practice, one of effective means is to enact legislation for fiscal
reconstruction which does not permit much room for reconsidering or revising the fiscal
reconstruction plan.  In the real economy both the Gramm-Rudman-Hottings Act in the
United States and the Fiscal Structural Reform Act in Japan have weakness in that they allow
for much room for reconsidering the fiscal reform.
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Appendix
We investigate the characteristics of the function  ) ( t B h . Here we specify the
function  m as24
a = m G G) ( ,  1 0 < a < . (A1)
Substituting (18) and (A1) into (13) and differentiating it with respect to 
¥
=1 } { t t B , we obtain
the following first order condition:
a -







1 1 ) (
1
1 1 t t t B h
r
n G G . (A2)
Since the policy function of this region is also given as (17), (18) and (A2) can be rewritten as
nT B nh B r B t t t - + + = + ) ( ) 1 ( 1 , (18)’
a -
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n B h nT B nh B r h . (A3)
We guess that the function  ) ( t B h  takes the following liner form:
q + + f = t t B r B h ) 1 ( ) ( . (A4)
Substituting (A4) into (A3), we obtain the conditions that the parameters  q f,  must satisfy:
a - f - + = f + +
1 / 1 } ) 1 ( 1 { ) 1 )( 1 ( n n r , (A5)
nT r n n r ) 1 ( } ) 1 ( 1 { } ) 1 ( 1 {
1 / 1 + f + f - + q = q + f +
a - . (A6)
The parameter  f satisfies
0 ) 1 /( 1 < f < - - n . (A7)
From (A5) and (A6), the parameter q is given by
r
nT r) 1 ( + f
- = q . (A8)
Remember that the function  ) ( t B h  is the optimal reaction function if it is smaller











If the above condition is satisfied, the level of the public investment per region is given as
) ( t B h .  Using (18)(A2)(A4)(A7) and (A8), we have then (21) and (22).26
References
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen, 1991, Why are stabilization delayed?, American Economic Review
81, 1170-1188.
Asako, K., T. Ito, and K. Sakamoto, 1991, The rise and fall of the deficit in Japan, Journal of
Japanese and International Economies 5, 451-472.
Barro, R.J., 1974, Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82,
1095-1117.
Becker, G.S. and C.B. Mulligan, 1998, Deadweight costs and the size of government, NBER
working paper 6789.
Beveridge, S. and C.R. Nelson, 1981, A new approach to decomposition of economic time
series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to
measurement of the 'business cycle', Journal of Monetary Economics 7, 151-174.
Bohn, H., 1998, The behavior of U.S. public debt and deficits, Quarterly Journal of
Economics , 949-963.
Doi, T., 1998, Is Japanese local finance really centralized?: From a viewpoint of the revenue-
expenditure nexus, Institute of Social Science Discussion Paper Series No. F-76,
University of Tokyo.
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey and H. Rosen, 1989, The revenue-expenditure nexus: Evidence
from local government data, International Economic Review 30, 415-429.
Homma, M., H. Abe, N. Atoda, T. Ihori, M. Kandori, and T. Mutoh, 1984, The debt neutrality
hypothesis: theoretical and empirical analysis for the Japanese economy,  Keizai
Bunseki, Economic Planning Agency, (in Japanese).
Ihori, T., 1989, The degree of debt neutrality: some evidence for the Japanese economy,
Economic Studies Quarterly 40, 66-74.27
Ihori, T. and J. Itaya, 1998, A dynamic analysis of fiscal reconstruction, mimeo.
Ishi, H., and T. Ihori, 1992, How have fiscal deficits been reduced in Japan?, mimeo.
Manage, M.L. and N. Marlow, 1986, The causal relation between federal government
expenditures and receipts, Southern Journal of Economics 52, 617-629.
Owoye, O., 1995, The causal relationship between taxes and expenditures in the G7 countries:
Cointegration and error-correction models, Applied Economic Letters 2, 19-22.
Pantula, S.G., G. Gonzalez-Farias and W.A. Fuller, 1994, A comparison of unit-root test
criteria, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 12, 449-459.
Toda, H.Y. and T. Yamamoto, 1995, Statistical  inference in vector  autoregressions with
possibly integrated processes, Journal of Econometrics 66, 225-250.
von  Furstenberg, G.M., R.J. Green and J.-H.  Jeong, 1985, Have taxes led government
expenditures? The United States as a test case, Journal of Public Policy 5, 321-348.
von Furstenberg, G.M., R.J. Green and J.-H. Jeong, 1986, Tax and spend, or spend and tax?,
Review of Economics and Statistics 68, 179-188.
Velasco, A., 1997, A model of endogenous fiscal deficits and delayed fiscal reforms,
NBER Working paper 6336.Table 1



























2 0.98 0.98 0.99
DW 2.11 2.04 1.81
η 65.8% 6.49% 86.0%
Note:
*** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 10%.Table 2
Test for sustainability
Dependent variable: st
Maximum likelihood estimation with annual data
Sample 1956-1998 1965-1998


















































































log L 149.232 149.204 149.319 149.276 119.178 117.915 119.279 118.078
Adj. R
2 0.802 0.808 0.801 0.806 0.812 0.798 0.807 0.794
Std. error 0.0082 0.0081 0.0082 0.0081 0.0076 0.0078 0.0078 0.0079
D.W. 1.457 1.466 1.478 1.487 1.808 1.686 1.816 1.706
Note:
a. The above parentheses indicate the t-values using White's consistent covariance.
b. D.W. denotes Durbin-Watson statistic.Table 3
Estimation of the VAR
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:




































































































































































































































log of likelihood function 722.274 log of likelihood function 908.027
std. error 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004
Adj. R
2 0.806 0.873 0.978 0.999 0.931 0.819 0.989 0.941
D.W. 2.190 2.401 2.032 1.877 2.075 2.113 2.061 2.029
Note:
a. sample: 1955-1997.
b. The above parentheses indicate the t-values.Table 4
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b. The above parentheses indicate the p-values of the hypothesis: The independent variable does not
Granger-cause the dependent variable.Figure 1




































































Dynamics of government debt
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Granger causality tests
∑
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